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Abstract: This article investigates the impact of different emotions on trust decisions taking into account the experience 
of betrayal. Thus, an experiment was created that included one betrayal group and one control group. Participants in the 
betrayal group experienced more intense feelings governed by negative emotions than participants in the control group 
did. Moreover, participants in the betrayal group significantly lowered their trust of another stranger. On the other hand, 
we found some evidence that neuroticism exaggerated the relationship between experienced betrayal and subsequent trust.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Trust is an important issue in organizations since it has 
been observed to be connected with many positive processes 
and outcomes. Gargiulo and Ertug [1] summarized the 
benefits of trust in an organization under three broad 
headings. First, trust can reduce the cost of monitoring and 
thus the number of safeguards. Second, it can reinforce 
commitment in a relationship. Third, it can lead to more 
open communication and to a richer exchange of resources 
among people. Although these benefits from trust are 
appealing, it is sometimes not easy for one person to trust 
another because of the vulnerability involved. Mayer, Davis, 
and Schoorman [2] have defined trust as a person’s 
willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that such a party will respond 
according to the former’s anticipation. In other words, 
trusting another person might open the possibility of being 
exploited by the latter party. Reduction in the number of 
safeguards might invite intrusions and over-commitment in a 
relationship that in turn may lead to groupthink. Also, a 
richer exhange of resources might give rise to the 
misappropriation of sensitive information. Therefore, it is 
not unusual that people may have difficulty in striking a 
balance between trust and distrust. 
 This struggle may be more intense when one faces a 
stranger. This is because there is no track record concerning 
the target’s trustworthiness on which a person can rely to 
form his or her judgment. In this paper we attempt to explore 
that emotion plays a part in an individual’s trust in a 
stranger. More specifically, we argue that an experience of 
betrayal, which is likely to generate negative emotions, may 
significantly affect an individual’s subsequent trust in 
another stranger. Such contagious effect has rarely been 
investigated [3], but is important in the sense that it creates 
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an obstacle for future trust-building. Nonetheless, we also 
suggest that a person’s personality with regard to emotions 
can make a difference in how an experience of betrayal 
impacts on one’s subsequent trust in a stranger.  
Emotions and Initial Trust 
 There is evidence showing that a person’s emotional state 
is likely to influence his or her judgment relating to trust [4]. 
Forgas and East [5] revealed that a person’s suspicion of a 
stranger is affected by the mood he or she experiences. When 
asked to judge whether a stranger had committed a theft and 
then denied the incident, sad participants were more likely to 
make guilt judgments than neutral and happy ones were. 
Dunn and Schweitzer [6] found that a person’s emotional 
state can affect his or her trust in a stranger. They recruited 
participants at a railway station and asked them to undergo 
an emotion-induction exercise which induced anger, sadness, 
or happiness by describing a past incident. Then the 
participants were asked to rate the trustworthiness of a 
previously identified unfamiliar co-worker. The results 
showed that participants in the happy condition were more 
trusting than those in the sad and angry conditions. 
Betrayal and Negative Emotions 
 The studies above have demonstrated that moods and 
emotions aroused from unrelated events affect a person’s 
trust in a stranger. Thus, we propose that feelings aroused 
from a trust-related event – a betrayal – may have a striking 
effect on an individual’s trust in a stranger. We adopt [7] 
Elangovan and Shapiro’s definition of betrayal, which 
describes the phenomenon as a violation of pivotal 
expectations of a trustor. Lazare [8] provided insights into 
the feelings he experienced once when he was betrayed: 
 “Two friends betrayed my trust over an important matter. 
Their lying about it only compounded my hurt. For 
weeks after this discovery, I was distraught and distracted 
from my daily activities… I began to question both my 
trusting approach to relationships and my overall ability 
to judge people” (p.16).  
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 From the description above, two consequences arising 
from the incident of betrayal can be identified. First, there 
was an emotional impact: the author felt hurt and distraught. 
Second, he questioned his trusting approach and ability to 
judge people. This experience is akin to a traumatic event, 
although to a lesser extent. The fact that betrayal can cause 
negative emotions has been reported in a number of studies. 
First, a violation of a psychological contract can be viewed 
as one form of betrayal because it comprises both the 
element of trust and the expectation that another party will 
fulfil his or her obligations [7, 9, 10]. Robinson and 
Morrison [11] have discovered that when a person sees that a 
breach of psychological contract is purposefully done by 
another party under unfair conditions, he or she will 
experience strong feelings of violation. Second, Koehler and 
Gershoff [12] discovered that people reported intense 
negative feelings toward the manufacturer of a safety 
product that caused the harm from which it was claimed to 
protect them. Other experimental studies have also revealed 
that betrayal is linked to negative emotions [13, 14]. 
 Feelings aroused from betrayal normally involve a 
number of negative emotions. First, when we are betrayed, 
most of us may feel disappointed or upset because the other 
party failed to meet our expectations [15]. Second, anger is 
also aroused because of the disappointment due to the 
unfairness of the act [16]. Third, a person may also 
encounter shame when betrayed because he or she thinks that 
his or her trust has been exploited [15, 17-19]. Therefore, our 
first hypothesis may be stated as follows: 
 H1: An experience of betrayal will cause feelings of 
disappointment, anger and shame. 
Betrayal and Subsequent Trust in Other Strangers 
 As recounted by Lazare [8], a betrayal incident may lead 
an individual to question one’s trusting approach. This is 
conceivable because people in crisis may sometimes 
challenge their basic values and beliefs [20]. There has been 
evidence suggesting that once a trust is violated, it is very 
difficult for a person to restore it to the level that existed 
before the violation took place [13, 14, 21]. Many of these 
studies investigated the effect of betrayal on subsequent trust 
of the same person. Nonetheless, we argue that the negative 
effect of betrayal on subsequent trust will also apply to other 
unrelated persons for two reasons. First, it is important to 
note that painful experience has been linked to 
counterfactual thoughts [22]. Such thoughts imply that a 
betrayed person may think that he or she would not have 
been in such a dire situation if only he or she had not been 
overly trusting. Second, the effect on subsequent trust is 
partly due to the emotions aroused by the betrayal, as well as 
the affective personality of an individuals. For example, self-
destructive individuals (characterized by low positive affect 
and high negative affect) and high affective individuals 
(characterized by high positve affect and high negative 
affect) are more vulnerable to trauma and negative life 
events [23]. 
 It has been recognized that the emotion system serves as 
an important motivational system [24]. Emotions arouse, 
sustain, and direct human actions [25] and shift a person’s 
attention to critical features of his or her environment [26, 
27]. For example, dissatisfaction and disappointment inform 
a person that the maintenance of the current behavior or 
decision is not justified [28]. 
 Empirical evidence has shown that negative emotions 
have an impact on decisions and judgments. Luce [29] 
reported that when a person is overwhelmed by negative 
emotions, he or she tends to refrain from making decisions. 
In the case of betrayal, this means that a person will defer the 
decision to trust another person whenever possible. Forgas 
and East [5] have found that those who were inflicted with a 
negative mood were more inclined to judge a target person 
as guilty of an offense. This implies that a negative affective 
state may arouse suspicion. Therefore, our second hypothesis 
states the following: 
H2: An experience of betrayal will have an adverse effect a 
person’s subsequent trust in a stranger. 
Individual Differences in Self-Regulation 
 However, while we postulate that an experience of 
betrayal in general will negatively affect a person’s 
subsequent trust in strangers, we still argue that there may 
exist individual differences in the reactions to betrayal. 
Parrot and Spackman [30] have contended that a person’s 
emotional state at the time of retrieving can redefine an 
event. People who are deficient in regulating emotions or 
who are vulnerable to negative emotions are less likely than 
others to maintain the same level of trust in strangers. Thus, 
we discuss neuroticism can moderate the relationship 
between an experience of betrayal and subsequent trust in 
strangers. 
Neuroticism 
 Neuroticism is one of the five domains in the Big-Five 
Personality Model and one of the three personality factors in 
Eysenck’s trait theory [31] and normally is associated with 
the inability to handle emotions. Neuroticism is sometimes 
termed as emotional instability [32, 33]. People who are high 
in neuroticism are normally regarded as moody, touchy, 
irritable, anxious, unstable, pessimistic, and complaining 
[34]. They are constantly in a tense state while those who are 
low in neuroticism are comparatively more relaxed [31]. 
Previous studies have reported that neuroticism is negatively 
correlated with emotional intelligence [35-37]. 
 People high in neuroticism are less likely to believe that 
their emotions can be changed and more likely to believe 
that their own emotions are too strong to be controlled [38, 
39]. They react more strongly to negative stimuli [37] and 
are particularly vulnerable to emotional change induced by 
events [40]. They also tend to adopt problematic coping 
strategies such as wishful thinking, withdrawal and emotion-
focused coping [40, 41]. Moreover, people high in 
neuroticism have less tolerance for negative situations [42]. 
As a result, they are less likely to stick with the same course 
of action that generates negative emotions. In terms of 
betrayal and trust, we predict that people high in neuroticism 
will exaggerate the implication of a betrayal experience and 
will be more likely to switch to a more conservative 
approach to strangers. Therefore, our final hypothesis states 
the following: 
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 H3: Neuroticism will further damage one’s subsequent 
trust in strangers in case of betrayal. 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Eighty-three business school students from the 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administration were recruited as participants. They were 
provided with the role of trustor in two different 
experimental conditions. 38.6 percent of the participants 
were female and 61.4 percent were male. Their average age 
was 23.0 years (SD = 2.56). Forty participants were included 
in the betrayal group and the other forty-three were included 
in the control group.  
Materials 
Trust Game 
 The trust game used [43, 44] implied that a trustor had 40 
kroner (about 7 US dollars) on hand. Whatever amount the 
trustor decided to give to the trustee, the amount would be 
multiplied by four. The trustee, on the other hand, could 
decide to choose whether he or she would give half of the 
multiplied amount back to the trustor, or simply take the 
whole multiplied amount for himself/herself.  
 In the trust game, the rational choice for the trustee is to 
take the whole multiplied amount for himself/herself, as long 
as he or she is maximizing the monetary payoff. Knowing 
the rational choice of the trustee, the rational choice for the 
trustor will be to keep the entire original amount and give the 
trustee nothing. However, trust arises if the trustor is willing 
to give any amount greater than zero. 
Measures of Trust – Amount Sent and Trust Rating 
 Both a behavioral measure and a survey measure of trust 
were used in connection with each of the two games. The 
behavioral measure, which has been used in previous studies 
[43, 45], was set to be the amount sent by the participants in 
the trust game. We then devised another survey measure 
which asked the participants to make a rating based on the 
following question: “I really trusted her to share half of the 
amount with me” using a 7-point Likert-type scale (from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree). The standardized 
coefficient alphas for these two measures of trust were .73 in 
game 1 and .81 in game 2, respectively. 
Negative Emotions 
Three negative emotions – anger, shame, and disappointment 
– were measured using a 5-point scale based on the PANAS 
scale [46]. The scale included the attributes “very slightly or 
not at all”, “a little”, “moderately”, “quite a bit”, and 
“extremely”. Only three negative emotions were chosen 
because these were closely related to the experience of 
betrayal. Anger is related to the unfairness of the situation 
[16]. Shame arise because one is being exploited [17]. 
Disappointment is due to the other party’s failure to meet 
one’s expectations [15]. In addition to individual emotions, 
we also combined the three emotions (anger, shame and 
disappointment) into a measure of averaged negative 
emotions. The coefficient alpha for this averaged measure 
for our sample was .76 
Neuroticism 
 We adopted the BFI-44 in order to measure the 
neuroticism of participants which was reprinted from [32]. 
We extracted nine items that are related to mood or emotions 
as the measurement of neuroticism by using a 5-point Likert-
type scale (from strongly disagree to strongly agree). Sample 
items include: “I see myself as someone who is depressed, 
blue”, “I see myself as someone who is relaxed, handles 
stress well”(reverse score), and “I see myself as someone 
who worries a lot”. The coefficient alpha for our sample was 
found to be .72. 
Manipulation Check 
 The manipulation check consisted of a single item 
measure. Participants were asked the following question: “I 
felt betrayed by the person in the game” using a 7-point 
Likert-type scale (from strongly disagree to strongly agree).  
Procedure 
Pre-experiment Preparation 
 Ten students, who were not part of the 83 participants, 
were asked to play the role of the trustee in the trust game. 
Each of them was told that he or she was going to play 
against a trustor. In the trust game, they could choose to 
either share half of the multiplied amount with the trustor or 
to take it all for themselves. Before they made their 
decisions, they were required to indicate that they wished to 
share the amount and this was recorded by a video camera. 
However, they were allowed to change their decisions 
afterwards and put the final decisions in writing. The whole 
process was videotaped. We explained the purpose of using 
the tapes and obtained the ten students’ consent. The 
students were informed that the clips and all related 
materials would be erased after completion of the 
experiment. These video clips were then presented to another 
eight students. These students were required to rate the 
trustworthiness of the trustees without knowing the latter’s 
final decisions. Based on their judgments, we chose two 
video clips that had the same rating. In one video-clip the 
trustee took the whole amount for herself and in the other the 
trustee shared it. Both trustees were female. In the 
experiment, only photos extracted from the video-clips were 
used. 
 Two days before the experiment, the eighty-three 
participants who would assume the role of trustor were first 
asked to fill in an online questionnaire for the assessment of 
their neuroticism.  
Experiment 
 The participants were initially introduced to how to play 
the trust game. They were given two trial games so that they 
were familiar with the rules. After the trial games, 
participants were randomly assigned to the betrayal group or 
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the control group by the computer program, based on the 
time each participant completed the trial games. The first 
completed participant was assigned to the betrayal group and 
the second one to the control group and so on. However, 
participants were not informed about the group to which they 
were assigned. Eventually, forty participants were assigned 
to the betrayal group and forty-three participants to the 
control group. Two participants did not complete the games. 
Betrayal Group 
 Participants in the betrayal group were first presented 
with a photo of the first trustee. In the photo this person was 
about to write down whether she would be willing to share 
half of the multiplied amounts. In the description the 
participants were told that the person in the photo agreed to 
share half of the multiplied amount with them. They were 
asked to decide on the amount (Kr. 0; Kr.10; Kr.20; Kr.30; 
Kr.40) they would give her. They were also asked to rate her 
trustworthiness. Next, the photo that displayed the answer 
actually written down by the trustee was shown to them. It 
stipulated that she took the whole amount for herself. The 
participants then proceeded to play the second trust game. 
Again they went through the same procedure as described in 
the first game except that this time the trustee’s answer 
indicated that she shared the amount.  
Control Group 
 In the control group, the same procedure was applied as 
was done in the betrayal group except that the answer of the 
first game was not shown to the participants before they 
played the second game. In other words, participants did not 
know the answer of the first trustee when they played against 
the second trustee. All the measures were the same. 
 For both groups, other information such as age and 
gender was collected at the end.  
Debriefing 
When participants had completed the experiment, they were 
asked to complete a “Post-experimental questionnaire”, 
asking them, among other questions, about the emotions they 
experienced at the time just before they started the second 
game. We did not ask before they started it, because 
prematurely calling attention to their emotions might have 
interfered with the emotional effects [5]. They were also 
asked to fill in the manipulation-check question. When all 
these procedures were completed, the purpose of the 
experiment was explained. The participants were given the 
maximum pay-offs no matter how well they actually 
performed in the games. This was to ensure that no one 
would suffer any loss because of the trustees’ decisions. 
Alternatively, they could waive the amount in return for an 
opportunity to take part in a lucky draw for a mini-laptop. 
RESULTS 
Manipulation Check 
 First, we conducted an independent-samples t-test on the 
mean scores of feeling of betrayal between the betrayal 
group and the control group. Participants in the betrayal 
group experienced a significantly stronger feeling of betrayal 
(M = 5.38, SD = 1.48) than those in the control group (M = 
2.60, SD = 1.20; t(81) = 9.61, p < .001). The results 
confirmed that our manipulation successfully produced a 
sense of betrayal in the betrayal group. 
Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1 stated that an experience of betrayal would 
be associated with negative emotions. An independent-
samples t-test was conducted to compare the average 
negative emotions experienced by the two groups. There was 
a significant difference in the scores for the betrayal group 
(M = 2.17, SD = .83) and the control group (M = 1.29, SD = 
.58; t(69) = -5.57, p < .001). In other words, the participants 
in the betrayal group experienced more negative emotions on 
average than the participants in the control group did. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported. 
 Hypotheses 2 proposed that an experience of betrayal 
would lower a person’s subsequent trust in a stranger. A 
mixed ANOVA was conducted with the amount sent (the 
behavioral measure of trust) as the dependent variable and 
group belonging (betrayal, control; between-subject factor) 
and the attempt order of the trust game (first attempt, second 
attempt; within-subject factor) as the independent variables. 
The impact of group on the amount sent was found to be 
significant, Wilks Lambda = .95, F (1, 81) = 4.08, p < .05. 
The mean amount sent in the betrayal group dropped from 
33.50 (SD = 8.93) in the first attempt to 28.00 (SD = 13.44) 
in the second attempt, whereas in the control group it 
dropped from only 31.40 (SD = 11.46) to 29.77 (SD = 
11.85). Another mixed ANOVA with the trust-rating (the 
survey measure of trust) as the dependent variable was also 
conducted. We discovered that the impact of group on trust 
rating was also significant, Wilks Lambda = .92, F (1, 81) = 
6.85, p < .05. The mean trust rating in the betrayal group 
dropped from 5.27 (SD = 1.06) in the first attempt to 4.70 
(SD = 1.09) in the second attempt, whereas in the control 
group it dropped from only 5.00 (SD = 1.59) to 4.93 (SD = 
1.47). Hypothesis 2 was thus supported. 
 Hypothesis 3 postulated that individuals who scored high 
in neuroticism would further lower their subsequent trust in 
other strangers because of the betrayal incident. A mixed 
ANOVA was performed to investigate whether neuroticism 
(continuous) moderated the impact of the group (betrayal, 
control) on the trust decisions. We found that neuroticism 
(continuous) significantly moderated the impact of group 
(betrayal, control; between-subject factor) on the trust ratings 
in the two attempts (first attempt, second attempt; within-
subject factor). Wilks Lambda = .89, F (2, 77) = 4.57, p < 
.05. However, it did not moderate the impact of group on the 
amount sent, Wilks Lambda = .95, F (2, 77) = 1.96, p = .15. 
Fig. (1). depicts the change in trust rating in each group 
(betrayal, control) across three categories of neuroticism 
(high, middle, and low). It shows that betrayal had a greater 
impact on trust change for people with high neuroticism than 
for those with medium or low neuroticism. Hypothesis 3 was 
thus partially supported.  
 Overall, our results showed that participants in the 
betrayal group experienced significantly more negative 
emotions. They were also more likely to change their 
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subsequent trust in strangers. Neuroticism tended to 
exaggerate the effect of betrayal on subsequent trust, but 
only limited to trust rating.  
DISCUSSION 
 Our results demonstrated that an experience of betrayal is 
associated with negative emotions such as anger, 
disappointment and shame. This confirms the results of a 
previous study, which indicated that betrayal gives rise to 
negative emotions [12]. On the other hand, the results also 
provided empirical evidence to support the claims that an 
incident of betrayal by a stranger will affect a person’s 
willingness to trust another stranger [3, 47]. In addition, we 
found some support that not all individuals adjust their trust 
decisions in the same way in the event of a betrayal. Some 
partial evidence showed that individual’s personality with 
regard to emotions has an impact on the relationship between 
betrayal and the change in subsequent trust. Our results 
showed that those who scored high in neuroticism tended to 
be more affected by the betrayal experience.  
 Nonetheless, the results concerning individual 
differences turned out to be more complicated than we had 
expected. The hypothesis relating to neuroticism was 
significant only with regard to the survey measure of trust, 
but not with regard to the behavioral measure of trust. To a 
certain extent, the difference in the results between the 
survey measure of trust and the behavorial measure was not 
surprising since similar differences have been found in a 
couple of empirical studies [48, 49]. The explanation of our 
results could be that the behavioral measure of trust included 
not only the trust motive but also other motives tied to, for 
instance, investments [13, 49]. It is thus possible that some 
participants rated the target person as trustworthy but 
decided to pay a lesser amount to her because of the fear of 
loss. 
 The above results imply that inside experiences of 
betrayal there exists an emotional component that might alter 
one’s subsequent trust decisions. It seems that depending on 
whether one is active or passive towards emotions, there 
could be an impact on how a betrayal affects one’s subseqent 
trust. An alternative explanation of the results could be that 
something more fundamental is at work: the implicit theories 
of emotions. Tamir, John, Srivastava, and Gross [50] argued 
that individuals are different in their beliefs about emotions. 
Some view emotions as fixed and thus have little incentives 
to try to modify them. Others view emotions as malleable 
and believe that they possess the ability to control them. 
Individuals who are high in neuroticism are characterized by 
their deficiency in negative mood repair [37], and therefore 
are more likely to view emotions as fixed and not 
modifiable. A previous study has found that people who are 
high in neuroticism are more likely to report that their 
emotions cannot be changed [38].  
Limitations and Future Research 
 Nevertheless, there may be other reasons for the change 
in subsequent trust. First, the incident of betrayal may make 
the possibility of betrayal salient. In other words, some 
people may start to realize the logic of the trust game 
thoroughly after that the betrayal takes place. The trust game 
was designed in such a way that if the trustee tried to 
maximize his or her return, nothing should be returned to the 
trustor. Following this logic, the trustor’s rational decision 
should be to retain all the possessed amounts. The 
heightened alertness due to this was thought to lead people to 
change their attitude toward the game and be more 
conservative in making another trust decision.  
 On the other hand, some people may tend to 
overgeneralize the trustworthiness of other people based on 
the first incident. Based on the betrayal experience, some 
may think that this is people in general’s typical response 
when they are in the position of a trustee in the trust game. 
These participants are not assessing the logic of the game. 
Rather, they try to generalize from the betrayal incident to 
people in general’s behavioral response in such a game. 
More studies are needed to investigate these other 
possibilities.  
 
Fig. (1). The impact of neuroticism on the change in trust-rating across two groups. 
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 Future studies may be needed to determine the role of 
emotional intelligence (EI) in the relationship between 
betrayal and subsequent recovery. Emotional intelligence 
was found to be negatively related to irrationality [51], and 
good at regulation of emotions [52]. We propose those who 
score high in EI may recover from a betrayal faster than 
those who score low. On the other hand, it may also be 
fruitful to investigate whether the implicit theories of 
emotion function as we have proposed when one faces 
betrayal. Furthermore, studies concerning affective 
personality and response to a betrayal should be carried out. 
This is based on the fact that affective personality has a 
significant effect on posttraumatic growth [23].  
CONCLUSION 
 This article shows that negative emotions accompany a 
betrayal. It also shows that an incident of betrayal may 
substantially lower a person’s subsequent trust in other 
strangers. In addition, our results show some signs that 
individuals’ neuroticism tendency may further damage one’s 
subsequent trust in strangers, although it is only partially 
supported. Overall, this study has provided some evidence 
that negative emotions accompanied by a betrayal incident, 
as well as an individual’s emotional personality, play a 
substantial part in affecting an individual’s subsequent trust 
in strangers.  
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